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ABSTRACT 
Family-controlled companies are noticeably widespread in Hong Kong. The 
feature of such companies is that its major shareholder is generally 
the founder of 七he company or his offspring. Most of them largely 
believe in their own management and would never easily allow any 
persons except for a family member to have control over the management 
of their operations. As a result, some of these companies may become a 
type of "person club" where only one person has all the say. The worst 
effect brought about in the operation of such companies is that they 
may neglect the interests of the minority shareholders. 
With the increasing market capitalization of the stock market in Hong 
Kong over recent years, minority shareholder protection has aroused the 
attention of the public. In order to maintain Hong Kong as the prime 
financial centre in Asia, it is of utmost importance to have a fair and 
well regulated investing environment. Consequently, protection of 
investors and the issue of Corporate Governance have been more 
emphasized by the general public. 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the current sufficiency of 
minority shareholders' protection in the local stock market. Special 
attention will be paid to insider dealing, foreign domiciled companies 
and the introduction of independent directors on the board. 
The prevailing regulations toward stock market trading activities and 
behaviours of directors of listed companies are studied. In order to 
have more useful input from relevant people in the industry, 
questionnaires were sent to and interviews were conducted with 
directors of listed some listed companies in Hong Kong. 
Recommendations are given at the end of this paper to address the lack 
of protection to minority shareholders. 
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In the preceding half decade, it is not too difficult to name some 
events which happened in the stock market which involve insufficient 
minority shareholders' protection. Examples include the huge director's 
remuneration declared by Sincere Department Ltd^ the first and second 
attempts of privatization by Cavendish (failed in the first attempt)2 
and increasing numbers of foreign domiciled listed companies^ 
It is undeniable that investors have to be very cautious when they are 
buying shares for investment purpose. It is common to most of the 
public investors that they are not involved in the daily management of 
company. Management plays an important role in deciding the strategy 
and behaviour of that company. Consequently, their conduct becomes an 
important concern to the public. 
1 
The directors of the Sincere Company, the Ma family, proposed a 117 percent increase in 
Directors' Remuneration, from $22 million in 1992 to $48 million in 1993, not including special 
bonuses of $66.68 million and $36 million, respectively, in 1993 and in 1992. 
Source : Target Intelligence Report. Jan 94, page 7. 
2 
Cavendish was incorporated in Feb 87 as wholly owned subsidiary of Hong Kong Electric. 
After in operation for 4 years, a proposal was put forward by Hutchison in February 1991 for 
Cavendish to become an wholly owned subsidiary and the proposal was not accepted by shareholders 
and lapsed in April 91. A second proposal made in May 1992, at an offer price of $5.5 per share, 
was accepted by the shareholders. The company was delisted in August 1992. 
Source : Wardleycards, 5 Aug 92. 
3 
jardine Matheson being the longest established company in Hong Kong changed domicile to 
Bermuda in 1984. Later in December 1992, the primary listing status was changed to Bermuda but 
still keeping its secondary listing status in Hong Kong. On 23 March 1994, they announced the 
delisting decision from Hong Kong Stock Market by end of 1994. 
2 
Purpose of the Study 
In this report, the following areas will be discussed in more detail ：-
1. The nature and significance of Corporate Governance. 
2. The evaluation of the present conditions of local stock market, 
with special emphasis on the dominant family ownership and 
control which is very unique in Hong Kong; 
3. The identification of the possible areas in which shareholders' 
right is inadequately protected. Insider Dealing, Foreign 
Domiciled Companies and the Introduction of Independent Directors 
in listed companies have become controversial issues on the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange. This paper will elaborate on possible 




With regard to 七he objective of this paper, the prevailing regulations 
and ordinances^ governing the activities of listed companies and 
behaviours of directors of those corporate entities are referred to. 
Questionnaires are sent to directors of 232^ publicly listed companies 
in Hong Kong. Purpose of which is to obtain views and comments from 
respondents on the present degree of minority shareholders' protection. 
In order to bring in some professional opinion, interviews were 
conducted with research manager of a reputable investing company in the 
colony and director of a medium size listed company. 
4 
Those includes : Securities Ordinance, Protection of Investors Ordinance, Securities and 
Futures Comnission Ordinance, Securities (Stock Exchange Listing) Rule, Companies Ordinance, The 
Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation Ordinance, The Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance 
and Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance. 
44 




In view of the limited time and resource available for the survey by 
sending questionnaires^ to directors of local listed companies, only 
about 9% out of the total 233 questionnaires sent were received and 
analyzed. 
The objective of the questionnaires is to collect feedback on existing 
degree of investors‘ protection and comment on the recommendations as 
proposed in the questionnaire. Respondents are all holding directorship 
in listed company in Hong Kong. In conjunction with the low response 
rate, the survey was not scientifically conducted. Instead of doing 
conventional statistical analysis such as chi square and t-test, the 
findings are simply summarised to identify the tendency of each 
questions in questionnaire which are focused on a single area. The 
information and opinions obtained are not exhaustive but represents a 
perception towards the current level of regulations in governing 
activities in stock exchange. 
36 





corporate Governance, as the name suggests, is concerned with the way 
corporate entities^ are governed, as distinct from the way businesses 
within those companies are managed. The significance of the field as a 
subject for serious study has been recognised only relatively recently. 
The globalization of markets, competition and finance in recent years 
has been one of the predominant reasons for the growing interest in 
corporate governance. 
Although the practice of corporate governance takes under the company 
laws, disclosure requirements and securities regulation of each 
specific jurisdiction^, most of the broad issues and concepts in 
corporate governance are universal. 
7 
In Hong Kong, corporate entities are fundamentally governed by the Company Ordinance (Cap 
32). 
8 
Securities Ordinances (Cap 333), Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance (Cap 24) and 




Why is Corporate Governance Important 
consider the increasingly sophisticated and complicated corporate 
system, it might suggest that the corporate system needs a clearer 
understanding because of the following reasons 
1. one of the most significant human systems ever created has been 
the joint stock, limited liability company. The concept of the 
company has enabled vast sums of capital to be tapped and even 
more wealth to be created. However, the simple system of 
corporate governance derived from scratch cannot cope adequately 
with the diversity and complexity of late twentieth century 
ownership patterns and board level functions. 
2. The significance of institutional investors 
Institutional investors, such as investment trusts, banks and 
pension funds, have become a significant influence on the 
corporation. Accounting for more than half of the market 
capitalize七ion on many stock exchanges, and a higher proportion 
of market activity, these investors have shown a tendency in the 
United States and Britain to wield influence through formal 
participation in shareholder matters, event the point of bringing 
litigation, and informally through direct contact with directors. 
Such activity, though potentially valuable, could prejudice the 
rights of other shareholders to equal treatment. 
3. The criminalisation of insider dealing 
"Insider trading" using privileged access to price sensitive 
information has drawn attention to the special position of 
directors, expected under stewardship theory to act in the utmost 
\ 
7 
good faith for the benefit of the shareholders as a whole�. In 
almost all jurisdiction insider dealing is now a criminal offence 
(but not in Hong Kong), although the extent of the prosecutions 
and the scale of the penalties vary considerably^®. 
4. Litigation against directors 
Action through the courts against companies, their boards and 
individual directors have increased dramatically, led by the 
United States experience but being followed elsewhere. Regulatory 
authorities around the world" have also been increasing the 
responsibilities of directors and the penalties for failure. 
5. Calls for more checks and balances at board level 
Demands for greater independence at board level have come from 
the pro七agonists of agency theoryi�, suggesting a majority of 
genuinely independent outside directors on the board, with an 
audit committee of such independents to liaise with the external 
auditors, a nominating committee also of outside directors to 
propose board replacements and a compensation committee, likewise 
independent, to assess top management and executive director 
remuneration, 
9 
Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance (Cap 395). 
10 
In a survey conducted by The Securities Bulletin (May 89〉, a number of countries were 
studied concerning their rules towards insider dealing. It was found that countries like Canada, 
Israel, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA, Australia, France, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Norway, Singapore, 
Argentina, Brazil and South Africa are treating insider dealing a criminal offence. 
11 
The Securities and Futures Commissions in Hong Kong. 
12 
Directors are the agents of the company, but their position is peculiar because of the 
very great extent of their powers and the very limited control that can be exercised over them by 
the shareholders of the company. The duties of a director are those applying to all fiduciaries 
(persons who are entrusted with property for the benefit of others). The duties are based upon 
showing the utmost good faith towards their principal, the company. 
Source : Hong Kong Company Law. Vanessa Stott, page 184. 
\ 
8 
6. New corporatised and privatised and corporate entities 
The recent trend in many countries, especially in PRC, to turn 
activities previously in the public sector, into corporate 
entities and sometimes to float them on the stock market has 
raised further governance issues; so have international joint 





THE CURRENT STOCK MARKET IN HONG KONG 
Characteristics 
The Hong Kong Stock Market possess the following unique 
characteristics:-
1. Notwithstanding the drastic increase in number of listed 
companies, total size of market capitalization of Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange is only HKD3,028 billion ^^ Investment from foreign 
investor^ such as pension fund and trust which are of huge size 
can exert influence on the daily movement of share prices, 
compared to such foreign capital, investment from local investors 
or what we called minority shareholders of listed companies are 
open to a riskier environment. 
2. The strong element of family ownership and control in the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange is the consequential effect of the culture of 
Chinese. The most dominant four big families are holding 
substantial portion of the total market capitalization ^ ^ 
As we can see, the wealth of colony is unevenly distributed. 
13 
See Appendix I, figures extracted from Hong Kong Economic Journal, 3rd Jan 94. 
14 
、 Hang Seng Index of Hong Kong Stock market jumped from 7500 points to historical high at 
12600 points from Oct to Dec 93, which represented about 68% growth over three months. The drastic 
increase in the index was largely contributed by influx of foreign capitals, especially Morgan 
Stanley which made a public announcement of increasing the weighting on Hong Kong shares in their 
investment portfolio. 
15 
See Appendix II, figures as at end of 93 and extracted from Hong Kong Economic Journal, 
,3rd Jan 94. 
10 
3. For the 20 largest firms listed in Hong Kong, excluding the 
HongkongBank in which internal regulation of shareholding limit 
for each individual investor exists^S the percentage of shares 
owned by major shareholders against the estimated percentage of 
free float available in the market place indicates that the local 
market is dominated by a relative handful of companies, often 
controlled by a single individual or family group. 
4. In conjunction of the open door policy of PRC government from 
1978 onwards, PRC economy is booming. Commercialization of state 
owned enterprise has resulted increasing listing applications in 
Hong Kong stock market 口. However, there are different 
accounting practice�management culture and director's 
behaviour between PRC and local companies, as long as they are 
getting more influential in the local stock market. 
16 
The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd Ordinance (Cap 70) stipulates that any 
single party shall not hold more than 1% of the total issued share capital of company. 
17 
See Appendix 3, figures extracted from Hong Kong Economic Journal on 3rd Jan 94. 
44 




The Securities and Futures Commission 
The Securities and Futures Commission was established by the Securities 
and Futures Commission Ordinance as the principal regulator of dealings 
in securities, investment schemes, and investment arrangements. The 
commission consists of a chairman appointed by the Governor and an 
uneven number, not less than seven, of other directors so appointed as 
the Governor may determine. Half of the directors (including the 
chairman) are appointed to be executive directors and the remainder are 
appointed to be non-executive directors. 
Function of the Securities and Futures Commission 
The principal function of the Securities and Futures Commission is to 
supervise and monitor the activities of the Exchange Companies^^ 
Power of the Securities and Futures Commission 
The main source of the Securities and Futures Commission power over 
'registered p e r s o n s c o m e s from the Securities Ordinance and the 
Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance. The Securities and Futures 
Commission is given with wide power from these Ordinances of entry, 
search, inspection and seizure. In ascertaining whether a 'registered 
person' is complying, or has complied, with these Ordinances. With 
regard to the contravention of 'registered persons' under these 
Ordinances, the Securities and Futures Commission may seek injunctive 
relief from the High Court. 
19 
Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance, s 4(d). 
20 
'Registered Persons' refers to those persons registered under the Securities Ordinance as 
a dealer, dealing partnership, dealer's representative, or investment advisers. 
‘ \ 
12 
Although the Securities and Futures Commission has great intervention 
power over internal Exchange Company via the use of restriction 
notices2i and suspension orders^^ these cannot be exercised without 
first consulting with the Financial Secretary. 
Different Bodies Within the Securities and Futures Commission 
1. standing Committee and Special Committee 
The committees can be established^ by the Securities and Futures 
commission to investigate, consider and handle any matters which 
is relevant to the securities and futures industry. 
2. Advisory Committee 
It was established^^ to contribute professional advices to the 
Securities and Futures Commission on strategic issues in the 
market. Meeting is conducted at least every three months. 
3. Securities and Futures Board of Appeal 
It was established^^ to respond to any appeals against judgements 
made by the Securities and Futures Commission. 
21 
Restriction notices may require an Exchange Company to amend, withdraw, or revoke, as 
specified in the notice, any provision of its memorandum of association articles of association, 
pSies or regulations, or other instruments: and to take such action relating to the management, 
conduct, or operation of business and activities. 
Source : The Stock Exchange Unification Ordinance, s 34(2). 
22 
Suspension orders may be used to suspend the functions of the governing bodies of the 
Exchange and clearing houses; the function of any committee or sub-committee established by the 
government body; and the function of the highest-ranking executive officer of the relevant Exchange 
Company. 
Source : The Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance, s 51(1). 
23 
The Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance, s 6. 
24 
The Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance, s 10. 
25 
The Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance, s18. 
\ 
13 
Rules and Regulations 
Regulations on securities related industries started from Feb 74 when 
七he first Securities Ordinance was passed at that time. Before that, 
there was no systematic control by government or other authority. 
Pursuant to the rapid changing and developing securities industry, 
七 here are now a number of ordinances in Hong Kong that contain 
provisions relating to the protection of investors. 
To ensure the fairness, systematic and efficient stock market, we have 
the appending regulations and ordinances for participants in this 
industry to follow 
1. Company Ordinance (Cap 32) 
This is the most fundamental ordinance that all companies加 must 
follow. 
2. Securities Ordinance (Cap 333) 
(passed in 74, with the most recent revision in 89) 
Basically, the ordinance clearly defines the regulating 
framework and sys七em for local securities industry. It contains 
special provisions relating to stock markets, registration of 
dealers, investment advisers and representatives trading in 
securities, the compensation fund, inspection and investigation 
and prevention of improper trading practices. 
3. Protection of Investors Ordinance (Cap 335) 
(passed together with Securities Ordinance in 74, 
being revised in 83 and 89) 
The ordinance gives protection to investors by the following 
ways:-
44 
Companies formed and registered under section 2 of the ordinance. 
\ 
14 
(1) Protect investors from misleading by fraudulent or reckless 
misrepresentation. Any person who found guilty will be 
liable on conviction on indictment to a fine of $1,000,000 
and to imprisonment for 7 years .27 
(2) If a person issues or possesses for the purposes of issue 
an advertisement or invitation which to his knowledge is or 
contains an invitation to the public to do any of the acts 
referred to above; or issues or possesses for the purposes 
of issue a document which to his knowledge contains an 
advertisement of invitation to the public to do any of 
those acts, he shall be guilty of an offence and shall be 
liable on conviction on indictment of a fine of $500,000 
and to imprisonment for 3 years.游 
4. Securities & Futures Commission Ordinance (Cap 24) 
(passed in Apr 89) 
The Ordinance established Securities and Futures Commission and 
amended the law about dealing in securities and trading in 
future contracts. It define the way in appointing directors of 
Securities and Futures Commission, and the functions of 
Securities and Futures Commission can exercise. 
5. The Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance (Cap 396) 
(passed in July 88) 
The ordinance requires certain persons holding shares in or 
debentures of listed companies to disclose their interests in 
those shares or debentures. Presently, the ordinance does not 
apply to warrants which could be a loophole of the ordinance. 
27 
s3(1), (3) Protection of Investors Ordinance. 
44 
s 4(1) ,(4) Protection of Investors Ordinance. 
\ 
15 
6. Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance (Cap 395) 
(passed in June 89) 
It aims to provide a more comprehensive definition of insider 
dealing and to authorize the Insider Dealing Tribunal to impose 





MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS' PROTECTION 
In some areas of the stock exchange, protection of minority 
shareholders can easily be jeopardized. They will be discussed in more 
detail here below. 
1. INSIDER TRADING 
Definition of Insider trading 
Section 141B(1) of the Securities Ordinance, we have the following 
defines insider trading as :-
A company if it is listed on the Exchange or has been so listed at any 
time in the preceding five years, insider dealing takes place 
1. When a dealing in securities is made, procured or occasioned by 
a person connected with that corporation who is in possession of 
relevant information concerning the securities; 
2. When relevant information concerning the securities is disclosed 
by a person connected with that corporation, directly or 
indirectly, to another person and the first-mentioned person 
knows or has reasonable grounds for believing that the other 
person will make use of the information for the purpose of 
dealing, or procuring another to deal in those securities. 
Insider dealing allegations can be very serious if a consequence is 
that investors lose confidence in the management of a business or in 
Hong Kong, this might have an undesirable effect on Hong Kong's 
position as a financial centre. 
\ 
17 
Penalty in Hong Kong 
If it appears to the Financial Secretary that insider trading in 
relation to the securities of a corporation has taken place, or may 
have taken place, he may require the Insider Dealing Tribunal to 
inquire into the mater (s.l41H(l)). The tribunal is chaired by a judge 
of the Supreme Court who sits with two members appointed by the 
Governor. 
Where a person has been identified as an insider dealer by the 
tribunal, he may be made the following orders :_ 
(a) disqualification of being appointed as directors of listed 
companies for a maximum period of five years; 
(b) he pay the government the amount of profit gained or loss avoided 
as a result of he insider dealing; 
(c) he be fined a maximum of three times the amount of any profit 
gained or loss avoided. (s23(1)) 
Section 140 of the Securities Ordinance provided for both criminal 
penalty and civil remedy for the other party to the transaction and for 
the company which issued the securities. Although enacted, section 140 
was never brought into effect. 
Worldwide Regulations on Insider Dealing 
In a survey conducted by The Securities Bulletin (May 89), several 
countries were studied concerning their rules towards insider dealing. 
Regarding the penalties to be imposed for insider dealing, the findings 
are summarized below :-
Fines or _ United Kingdom, United States of America. 
Imprisonment 
Fines and/or - Australia, Malaysia, Singapore. 
Imprisonment 
18 
The terms of imprisonment vary with different countries :-
Up to 7 years - Malaysia, the United Kingdom. 
Up to 5 years - Australia. 
Up to 3 years - �Sirngapore. 
Problem in prosecuting Insider dealers 
Section 140 of Securities Ordinances 1974 provided for both criminal 
penalty and civil remedy for the other party to the transaction and 
for the company which issued the securities. Although enacted, section 
140 was never brought into effect. It was eventually repealed by the 
Securities (Amendment) Ordinance 1978. 
The Government considers that criminal or civil sanctions would not be 
effective in preventing insider dealing in Hong Kong, since it would 
often be impossible to obtain sufficient evidence for the courts. There 
have few successful prosecutions under insider trading legislation in 
the united Kingdom, Australia and the United States of America. 
Enforcement is weak and costly due to the following ambiguities 
一 the meaning of the term "relevant information" is unclear; 
_ it is not clear whether tippees are liable for acting on 
information which has been passed to them. 
_ 七he ordinance provides that a person who enters into a 
transaction which is an insider dealing may be held not 
culpable of his purpose is not, or is not primarily, the 
making of profit or the avoiding of a loss (whether for 
himself or another) by the use of relevant information. 
Notwithstanding the above problems, some people in the market have 
appealed for a change of insider dealing offence to a Criminal Offence 
as 
19 
- Light penalties have had little deterrent effect. 
_ At the present moment, any person who is suspected of 
insider dealing is given privilege that he is subjected to 
inquiry by the Insider Dealing Tribunal in private. The 
Insider Dealing Tribunal should be abolished and that all 
suspected insider dealers be subject to the normal criminal 
process. 
Opposing View to Insider Dealing 
If insiders were not allowed to hold any stocks of their corporations, 
the problem of insider dealing would be solved, but the function of 
specialization provided by the stock market would be lost and other 
less efficient ways of providing incentives for entrepreneurs to manage 
and innovate would have to be relied on. Forced disclosure of private 
information at an inadequate time will distort the optimal timing of 
innovation. 
some people also commented that insider trading allows any individual 
who works for a publicly traded corporation to play the entrepreneurial 
role, a very important advantage. "Profit from insider trading 
constitute the only effective compensation scheme for entrepreneurial 
services in large corporation":). To provide effective incentive, 
entrepreneurial compensation has to be available when the benefits are 
realized by the corporation, and it must vary with the value of the 
contribution. Obviously, salary is inappropriate. The amount of salary 
has to be decided on in advance, it does not allow for distinguishing 
the entrepreneur who only manages from one who also innovate, and it is 
not flexible among to reward particular contributions. 
29 
Richard A. Posner, Kenneth E. Scott, •• Economics of Corporation Law and Securities 
Regulation : In Defense of Insider Trading.", page 134. 
20 
Regulation of insider dealing has done nothing to improve the price 
performance and the efficiency of the stock market in transmitting 
information. It is also argued that great developments, measured in 
stock price impact, do not happen very often in any company. And news 
of these occurrence is not always the exclusive property of a few 
insiders. Therefore really significant trading by insiders is probably 
not a very common occurrence. A complete disclosure requirement 
destroys incentives to produce information, and not all information is 
of the socially worthless, valuable only for private trading 
purposes气 
People should admit that it is often difficult to distinguish between 
insider dealing, illegal transactions, and misinformation. It is 
equally difficult to distinguish mistakes with improper motivation and 
without. 
Generally, the foregoing suggests that over bureaucracy that might 
undermine the efficiency of the tool and over-stringent rules that 
might dissuade investors from holding legitimate stocks in their own 
companies. 
30 Richard A. Posner, Kenneth E. Scott, “ Economics of Corporation Law and Securities Regulation : Insider Trading. Disclosure and Corporate Privacy.", pages 124-125.
21 
2. Introduction of Independent Directors 
The New Era for Independent Directors 
From 1 Jan 94, every company listed, or desiring to be listed, on the 
stock exchange of Hong Kong will be obliged to appoint at least one 
independent non-executive director to the Board. By the end of 94, the 
Listing Rules will be tightened even further, with the requirement that 
a second, independent non-executive director be appointed.(s3.10 of 
Listing Rules) 
In assessing the independence of a non-executive director, the 
following matters will be taken account ：-
1. the holding of a shareholding interest in the issuer of not more 
than 1% of the total issued share capital; 
2. the director should normally have no past or present financial or 
other interest in the business of the issuer or its subsidiaries; 
3. the director would not be expected by the Exchange to have any 
management function in the group. (s3.11 of Listing Rules) 
Why Independent Directors are so Important 
The intended purpose of appointing independent non-executive directors 
is to act as a conscience of the Board and to stimulate debate on 
issues before decisions are taken. The independent directors are 
especially important in a publicly listed company which is 'family 
run', of which there are many instances in Hong Kong, in that most, if 
not all of,七he directors are members of one family, or have some 
connection with that family. 
The board of directors of an issuer (company) is collectively 
responsible for the management and operation of the issuer. Therefore, 
being divorced from the day-to-day business of any company to which 
they lend the effulgence of their standing in the community, offers no 
immunity from responsibility for actions taken by the Board. It is 
22 
vulnerable as a director of companies in which he played no executive 
role in their day-to-day operations, in light of an increasing severity 
in the regulation of the affairs of public listed companies. To 
underline the concern,七he Companies Ordinance makes no distinction 
between executive directors, non-executive directors, or independent 
non executive directors. 
Nature of Their Role 
Independent Directors generally define themselves as influential rather 
than powerful. They tend to perceive the role they play as more passive 
than active. 
For 七he independent director to be perceived as competent in any 
particular boardroom, it is necessary for him to maintain an adequate 
level of relationship with all his fellow directors. This will ensure 
that the board is able to operate smoothly and the directors will be 
able to work together easily. They must be amicable and able to 
communicate easily. He must present an appearance of getting on with 
his colleagues in order for the decision-making process to operate 
smoothly. The independent director must employ tact and diplomacy in 
order to present his questions, suggestions or disagreements without 
giving offense to his colleagues. He must acquire the 'common language' 
of his board and become integrated into the existing structure, before 
he is able to perform his role adequately. This integration becomes the 
vehicle by which he can make himself heard. 
23 
3. FOREIGN DOMICILED COMPANIES 
The Stock Exchange is considering the waive of a number of listing 
requirements for some of the bigger companies in a bid to keep their 
primary listings in the territory. They would be subject to minimal 
initial listing requirements but would have to meet the normal 
prospectus obligations for new capital-raising exercises. The reason 
behind for the relaxation in rules is if such a form of exempt listing 
was not made available, a total delisting in Hong Kong would be the 
ultimate alternative for foreign companies taking the view that to be 
regulated in Hong Kong after 1997 is an unacceptable risk. This would 
have serious adverse effects on the local brokerage industry, stock 
market trading and the financial markets as a whole. The recent 
delisting decision made by Jardine is a typical example to show the 
above threat. 
However, there are some voices in Hong Kong requesting for more 
stringent measures against those companies domiciled overseas. They 
believes companies incorporated abroad with primary listings in Hong 
Kong could be required to abide stricter provisions under local company 
and securities laws. There were already limited provisions in Hong Kong 
company law that applied to overseas company^^ Considering the 
overseas section in the existing ordinance insufficient in scope and 
sanction as far as protecting shareholders was concerned. 
At the moment, the only control we have over these companies is through 
the exchange listing rules and the only sanction we have is the threat 
of delisting. Delisting may be either ineffective or positively 
counter-productive because it damages the interest of minority 
shareholders. Even though public investors can still have the right to 
31 
In the common law jurisdiction, the principle has generally been that the law applying to 
overseas corporations is the law of the place of the incorporation. 
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sell their shares-on-hand, when the company is approaching delisting, 
the market price will certainly be at a greater discount. Public 
investors will still suffer. 
25 
4. Director's Remuneration 
Prompted by the proposal of Ma family whose is the controlling 
shareholder of the Sincere Company Ltd, for the fiscal year ended 
February 93 a 117 % increase in Director's Remuneration which 
represented a growth from $22m to $48m from fiscal 92 to 93, calls from 
various sources have been made for closer scrutiny of payments to 
directors of publicly listed company. 
At the moment the Listing Rules do not prevent a director who is also 
a shareholder from voting at a shareholders meeting on a resolution 
concerning that director's remuneration. Under the present regulatory 
framework, the amount of director's remuneration will need to be 
approved by members of the company at the Annual General Meeting, and 
the directors, if they are also members of the company, are not allowed 
to vote in this matter as it may constitute a conflict of interest. 
However, shareholders' interests may not be as well protected as it is 
thought out to be as, in practice, most individual shareholders are 
indifferent to exercising their voting rights because they own only a 
minority stake in their company. More important. Director's 
remuneration is a difficult issue, because such payments formed part of 
the profit and loss account, which was likely to be passed as a whole. 
A survey was conducted to identify companies which have declared more 
than 50% of the profit from company as director's remuneration in 
199332. Purpose of this survey is to study the common characteristics 
of those companies classified as high director remuneration declaring 
companies. 
The findings suggest that majority of which are small or medium size 
32 See Appendix IV, figures extracted from Hong Kong Economic Journal, 3rd Jan 94. 
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listed entities in the market. There is a propensity for listed company 
with relatively smaller size of market capitalization to overpay 
directors. In the same fiscal year of 1993, some blue chips reported 
substantially lower director's remuneration^^. 
This indicates that investors needs to exercise great care when buying 
those companies of smaller market capitalization as they are running 
the risk of overpaying the directors. 
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For fiscal 93, some figures of director's remuneration to net profit ratio are highlighted 
below :-
Ratio 
Hang Seng Bank 0-24% 
Hong Kong Land 0.65? 
Cheung Kong 0.67% 
Jardine Matheson 0.36% 
Source : Hong Kong Economic Journal, 3 Jan 1994, page 27. 
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INTERIM RESULTS ANNOUNCEMENT 
Some of 七he PRC based companies, e.g. Tsingtao Beer are prepared not to 
have interim financial result announcement in future^ because of the 
difference in accounting procedures and methods across the border. 
In order to save man and effort in preparing the interim financial 
report to shareholders, it is very likely that the above practice will 
be followed by other companies. Although the above practice does not 
violate any of the listing regulation, it will certainly reduce the 
transparency of the company to investors. 
It is pointed out that listing regulations should be amended to enforce 
the interim results announcement. 
FI. RESPONSIBILITY OF AUDITORS 
The public generally believes that an auditor's responsibility is to 
detect and report fraud. However, auditors are in fact only responsible 
to the extent that fraud and other irregularities have a material 
effect on a company's financial statements. The requirement in 
accounting reports that the accountants express an opinion on whether 
the information gives a true and fair view of the financial status. 
Although the disclosure requirement for accounts of Hong Kong public 
companies are broadly in line with international standards, there have 
been inadequate supervision of these reporting requirements. The over 
qualification of company accounts to such an extent where the end 
product is meaningless. 
Accountants have a contractual obligation to their clients. This 
44 
26th Oct 1993, South China Morning Post, page 1. 
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stipulates they cannot reveal any information to a third party without 
the client's consent. So, accepting the responsibility in reporting 
fraud will have very far reaching implications for the entire auditing 
profession. It could even undermine the very basis of the auditor's 
primary role. On the other end, they also agreed they have a moral 
obligation to call the Government's attention to any irregularities in 
a company's financial statements. A proposal is called on the 
Government to amend appropriate legislation to require such a 
tripartite meeting to be called to discuss any suspected 
irregularities. In this way, accountants cannot be ruled as having 
breached contractual obligations with their clients. 
7. PRIVATIZATION 
Privatization has been common in Hong Kong in recent years especially 
in 198935 because the lower interest rate^^ make the cost of borrowing 
funds to buy out minority shareholders cheaper. 
in Hong Kong, privatization may be effected in one of two ways - by a 
scheme of arrangement under Section 166 of the Companies Ordinance or 
by a general offer under the Hong Kong Code on Takeovers and Mergers. 
Delisting follows as a consequence of privatization because the 
company's shares are no longer in public hands. 
A delisting may result in minority shareholders being left with an 
illiquid investment. Recognising the lack of minority protection when 
a company chooses to delist voluntarily. Typically, the amount of 
35 
Number of successful privatizations of listed companies in Hong Kong Stock Exchange : 
1988 : 4 1989 : 8 1990 : 5 
1991 : 2 1992 : 2 1993 : 0 
The foregoing suggests that privatization becomes popular when the stock market is bearish like in 
1989 as share prices discounted significantly to the net asset value. 
Source : Au Yeung Yiu-fai, Mak Shui Choi, ” Hona Kong Economic Journal Monthly Magazine", November 
1993, page 102-103. 
36 
The prevailing best lending rate in Hong Kong is 6.75%, which is an historical low level. 
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shares in public hands is small - only 25 per cent in many cases - thus 
enabling the necessary shareholders' resolutions to be passed without 
undue difficulty. Further, it is estimated 40 per cent of daily trading 
volume is attributable to the activities of controlling shareholders^^ 
Although investors can choose to accept the proposal offered by 
company, when the offer price is substantially under stated as compared 
to the net asset value^S investors will undoubtedly have no other 
alternative but disposing their shares unwillingly. 
8. PROFIT PROJECTIONS 
With effect from 29th December 1993, the release of any projected 
profits by issuers or their directors by way of press announcement, 
press release or any other means constitutes the disclosure of price 
sensitive information are under more stringent regulations by Stock 
Exchange than before. 
Whenever any such release occur, the Exchange reserves the right to 
require it to be accompanied by a proper profit forecast and a report 
from the issuer's reporting accountants, having duly reviewed the 
accounting policies and calculations of the issuer, as well as a report 
by the financial advisers of the issuers, having satisfied themselves 
that the forecast has been made after due and careful enquiry. In 
addition, profit forecast periods which do not end on the date of the 
financial year end or half year end will not be permitted. 
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The Securities Bulletin, "on Market Surveillance : An Interview with Mr. Paul Phoenix" 
(1989) 35 The Securities Bulletin, March 1989. 
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cavendish was incorporated in Feb 87 as wholly owned subsidiary。、"�"gj；二ElectrJ二 
After in operation for 4 years, a proposal was put forward by Hutchison in February 1991 for 
cavendish to become an wholly owned subsidiary. The price offered was $4.10 in cash for each share. 
The proposal was not accepted by shareholders and lapsed in April 1991. 
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Directors of a listed company owe a duty of care to persons who 
subscribe for shares in reliance on a prospectus. When the profit 
projection is publicized, all investors, individual or institutional, 
in the market could be the potential subscribers to the shares of this 
company•恥 
9. DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT 
Section 14 (1)(a) of the Securities Ordinance exempts shareholders of 
10 percent or more holdings from notifying the authorities if the 
authorities if the interests are held in a trust. This disclosure law 
exempts substantial shareholders of listed companies from notifying any 
discretionary interests. Shareholders could get around disclosure 
obligations while maintaining control of the interests by setting up 
discretionary trusts which are under their influence. 4i 
Discretionary trusts are common in Hong Kong for tax purposes. A 
person is deemed to have an interest in shares if he owns the shares, 
exercises rights bestowed by them, or if a corporation that owns the 
shares acts in accordance with his or her directions. But Section 14 
specifies that, among others, any discretionary interest will not be 
regarded as reportable interest. In the case of discretionary trusts, 
the beneficiaries do not have any influence over the shares concerned 
如 A Dublic limited company issued a prospectus in respect of a rights issues and P subscribed 
for sharesPunder thiat'tfssue.PHe subsequently purchased shares through the stock market, relying on 
boJh the prospectus and two interim reports. He alleged that the documents contained 
m?rrepreLn?ations and argued that the company owed him a duty of care in J^e doc^ents 
because it was reasonably foreseeable that he might rely on them in deciding to purchase and had 
suffered damage as a result of subscribing and purchasing. 
It was held that although directors owe a duty of care to persons who subscribe for shares 丄n 
r^^ance on a prLpectus, they did not owe a duty to a shareholder or anyone else who rehed on the 
pr^pecLs fo'^  the pui^pos/of purchasing through the stock market because there was an 
insufficiently proximate relationship between them. 
source : Al Nakib Investments (Jersey) Ltd v Longcroft (1991), Vanessa Stott, Honq KOOR Company 
Law, page 82. 
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In September 1989 when the Takeovers Committee contested the sale by Li Ka-shing's Cheung 
Kong of shares in property company Kwong Sang Hong to Peregrine Securities,〗n w h巧 Li has 
staL Despite having a mutual major shareholder. Peregrine successfully argued that it was not 
acting in concert with Cheung Kong, which make 851 million on the transaction. 
Source : Jonathan Friedland, Watchdog,s new teeth. Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 April 1990, page 
78. ‘ 
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as the trustees can allocate income from the trusts wherever they want. 
10. Financial Statement 
The way local companies prepare financial statements are being 
criticised as inadequate on the area of disclosure of vital 
information. Although the reports comply with listing rules, laws and 
financial standards in most cases, there are no explanations whatsoever 
on how these apply to the companies. 
Although the disclosure requirements of accounts for Hong Kong public 
companies are in line with international standards, there had been 
inadequate supervision of there reporting requirements in the past. 
11. Trigger Level 
The definition of "acting in concert" has long been a thorny issue in 
Hong Kong. Controlling shareholders in a company frequently hold their 
stake through several different entities. They often act alongside 
friends or relatives in a takeover bid. And, on many occasions, they 
transfer assets - at debatable prices - from one of their companies to 
another. 
The current trigger point for a general offer of 35% or the annual 
"creeper" provision^^ of 5% are arguable in the market. In a market 
like Hong Kong where most companies are controlled by large blocks, 
often in excess of 35%, and where competing bids are rare, the need to 
lower the threshold or trigger level to a level below the existing 35% 
is not so clear as it is, for instance, in London. The decision to 
maintain the 5% "creeper" provision _ the maximum amount of shares a 
person controlling 35-50% can buy in any 12 months 一 was more 
controversial. Some regulators argued either in favour of lowering the 
annual restriction from 5% to 2% of outstanding shares or extending the 
one-year period to two, while maintaining the 5% level. 
44 






Questionnaires^^ were sent to executive directors who are now holding 
influential position in listed companies in Hong Kong, of 223 publicly 
held companies. The purpose of the survey are :-
1. TO ascertain and gauge their altitude towards the current degree 
of minority shareholders' protection. 
2. To solicit their opinion concerning the abovementioned areas or 
commercial transactions. 
I ought to say that this is not meant to be a scientific survey; rather 
a tool to achieve the above two objectives. 
unfortunately, the response rate of 9 % is far from satisfactory. 
However, some conclusions may be drawn from the 21 returned sets of 
questionnaires, as to the present level of minority shareholders' 
protection and the willingness of companies in complying with existing 
regulations, and preceding to more open and fair business environment 
in future. 
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223 sets of questionnaires were sent to directors of listed companies 
in Hong Kong without biasing in particular industries. 21 completed 
sets are received. A survey of the findings are highlighted below :-
1(a) Yes 6 No 15 No Comment 0 
(b) Yes 14 No 6 No Comment 1 
2 Yes 4 No 14 No Comment 3 
3 Yes No 3 No Comment 0 
4 Yes 5 No S No Comment 11 
5 Yes 9 No 旦 No Comment 4 
6 Yes 15 No 6 No Comment 0 
7 Yes 18 No 3 No Comment 0 
8(a) Yes 4 No 15. No Comment 2 
(b) Yes 13 No 旦 No Comment 0 
9(a) Optimum no. of independent directors : 
1 (12%) 
2 (60%) 
3 or more (28%) 
(b) Yes 21 No 0 No Comment 0 
From the above findings, the following major observations are made 
1. Insider Dealing 
Majority of respondents consider local rules is adequate towards 
insider dealing, and it would be too cost ineffective to bring in 
too many regulations in spotting possible insider traders. 
2. Director's Remuneration 
Not surprisingly, many of the replies did not agree to the 
proposal of more degree of Director's Remuneration disclosure. 
44 
Mainly based on information provided by the replied and completed questionnaires. 
\ 
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They thought it is not a fair approach to directly relate the 
return of directors to the profit derived from the company, many 
external factors, such as the general economic condition may 
affect the overall performance to company notwithstanding the 
effort directors have put into the company. 
3. I 七 is already the traditionally ways of all locally listed 
companies to have interim results announcements. As a result, the 
proposal of making it formally is well accepted by most of the 
respondents. 
4. The question introduces more concerns on the current company 
ordinances in which many directors did not have comments. 
5. This is actually a dilemma the Stock Market is facing now. 
Judging from the about equal Yes/No replies, there being no 
. dominant opinion to say whether the watchdog should be relax or 
not on foreign domiciled companies. 
6. To be comparable to other overseas financial centre whose stock 
market allow shares buy back, a dominant voice is noticed from 
the replied questionnaires in asking for shares buy back 
legalisation. However, details of which, such as the maximum 
percentage for major shareholders to acquire further is subject 
to further discussion. 
7. Directors are well aware the importance of their projection on 
future profitability especially when those information are 
publicly released. Therefore, nearly all of them have no 
objection to the most recent rule as laid down by the Stock 
Exchange. 
8. Holding of share under discretionary trust is getting more 
popular. Though it is easily used by major shareholders to 
\ 
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strengthen their power, once the suggestion of including those 
ownership when calculating the 10% trigger point will not be so 
practical as commented by many existing directors. It will be a 
costly but ineffective measures. 
9. This is one of the most effective mean to protect minority 
shareholders by introducing independent directors. 100% of 
respondents agree to the proposal. In addition, 2 independent 
director in board are most welcomed by directors, which is also 





in addition to the survey by sending questionnaires, an interview was 
also conducted with Mr. Elvis Li, Director of The Hong Kong Four Seas 
Travel International Ltd^^ Through the interview with Mr. Li who is 
acting as director of a relatively new listed company in Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange, some professional comments on the prevailing extent of 
regulations governing the running of listed companies are obtained 
which is also the prime objective of this interview. 
Findings 
Mr Li has expressed some of his personal opinions to the current 
regulatory system in the local securities industry and they are 
highlighted below :-
1. He personally felt that the current securities industry is not 
stringently governed as compared to other countries such as 
united States of America. Notwithstanding the presence of many 
ordinances and listing regulations, enforcement is difficult and 
most importantly offenders are only liable to mild punishment. 
2. Even though he made the point of the present relaxing regulatory 
measures towards relevant participant in the stock market, too 
stringent the measures will be running the risk of being not 
flexible and therefore drive away foreign investors. 
3. In general, Mr Li would suggest that the laissez faire policy 
should be adopted in Hong Kong. 
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Hong Kong Four Seas Travel International Ltd was successfully listed on the Hong Kong Stock 





in view of the costly and ineffectiveness in prosecuting insider 
dealers in Hong Kong, the government is urged to plug the loophole. The 
e x i s t i n g provisions relating to insider dealing found in Part XIIA of 
the Securities Ordinance are unsatisfactory. 
1. The meaning of "relevant information" is unclear. A better 
definition should be formulated in respect of the degree of 
dissemination which will make the information generally 
available. The information will not be considered to be generally 
available until sufficient time has elapsed for that announcement 
to be made on the trading floor of the Exchange or published in 
newspaper. 
2. Insider dealing should be made a criminal offence and the 
offender should be subject to heavy criminal penalties. 
3. The Insider Dealing Tribunal should be abolished. A person 
against whom fraud is alleged in civil or criminal 
proceedings in a court of law is normally exposed to the 
full glare of a public hearing. No special privilege should 
be paid to suspected insider dealers and they must be 
subject to the normal criminal process. 
4. The Americans have far more experience in prosecuting insiders, 
with its Securities and Exchange Commission actively hunting down 
insider traders. Hong Kong can learn more from the Americans 
rather than the British. 
\ 
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2. Foreign DomiciJed Companies 
1. The Securities and Futures Commission should require offshore 
companies to have resident directors in Hong Kong who will take 
the responsibility for the offshore companies to ensure that they 
comply with local legislation. And to give the commission a 
stronger grip to deal more effectively against possible abuses by 
offshore companies, the Securities and Futures Commission is also 
studying extending Hong Kong's company law jurisdiction to a far 
greater extent than what is currently in practice. This could 
involve amending the Companies and Securities Ordinance to make 
offshore companies with a primary listing on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange liable to some or all of the provisions which apply to 
publicly-listed companies incorporated here. 
2. It is likewise important in any case of suspected fraud that may 
arise to be able to apply the provisions of Hong Kong Ordinances 
to such companies in order to allow the Financial Secretary to 
appoint an inspector to the holding company. 
3. The booming economy in Asian Pacific Rim particularly in PRC 
should enhance the importance of Hong Kong as a supporting 
centre. There will be increasing number of overseas companies 
going for listed in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in seeking for 
a foothold here. Therefore, it suggests that the Securities and 
Futures Commission should not relax any of the existing 
regulations. The cases of voluntarily delisting of Jardine 
Matheson should be very exceptional. 
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3. Introduction of Independent： Directors 
1. Subject to the requirement (s3.10 of listing rule), the absolute 
number of independent director in every board of listed companies 
deemed inappropriate and inflexible. However, the Exchange may 
stipulate for a minimum number of independent directors which is 
higher than two if, in the opinion of the Exchange, the size of 
the board or other circumstances of the issuer justify it, no 
definite elaboration about the above has come out yet. In order 
to better reflect the influencing power of independent director 
in board, it is more sensible to have the minimum number of them 
be expressed in respect of the board size. In other words, the 
number should be stipulated in the percentage of total directors 
on the board. 
2. The requirement states that non-executives should be independent, 
but gives only loose guidelines about what this means. Even the 
definition of independent meaning no family ties is unfair. A 
greyer area is company links, such as people being part of a 
company's supplier or customer chain. 
3. It is difficult to search such directors whereas the new 
regulations are complied. If every company takes on two genuine 
independent director who understand the company and Hong Kong, we 
will simply run out of directors. Therefore, companies should be 
encourage to consult the Securities and Futures Commission 
whenever they have doubts on the appointment of independent 
directors. 
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4. Director's Remuneration 
1. In order that the shareholders and investors be well informed, it 
is suggested that the Stock Exchange make it compulsory for all 
listed companies, when advertising their interim and final 
results in the local Press, to disclose all the benefits that 
they receive from the company, in fees, emoluments, share-option 
scheme, benefits in kind and what-have-you. 
2. Giving credit to outperforming directors by paying them 
considerable amount of remuneration is well justified as long as 
the companies are making decent profit. This can be conducted in 
a quantifiable manner. New regulation is recommended to restrict 
companies paying director's remuneration in any forms by not 
exceeding a certain percentage of the net profit in the same 
fiscal year. The tentative ceiling percentage should be in the 




The treatment of minority shareholders in Hong Kong is certainly an 
important issue that needs to be looked at. It relates to the 
perception of Hong Kong by international players. 
After analysing those relevant ordinances, survey by sending 
questionnaires and interviewing with existing directors of listed 
company and interview, it can be concluded that there are still ample 
of areas in 七he securities industry we can impose more stringent rules 
so as to create a more fair investment environment, particularly in the 
area of insider dealing, foreign domiciled companies, introduction of 
independent directors and director's remuneration. 
However, to maintain the autonomy and attraction to both foreign and 
local investors, especially the former, too stringent the control will 
drive away foreign interest in the market. Therefore, the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange is experiencing the dilemma. 
TO strike the balance, the authority has to be very careful in bringing 
in any new regulation concerning the behaviour and conduct of all 
market players which includes directors ^  of companies, auditors, 
institutional and private investors and other related people. 
The foregoing findings suggest that the right and protection of public 
investors who are exposed to commonly available information in the 
market should go first. The governing body in Hong Kong should be 
putting stronger controls, m o r e discipline, and establishing a stronger 
base for the markets to grow in a healthy way. 
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APPENDIX I 
Total Market Capitalization of Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
(as at 31 Dec 19XX) 
Year No. of Listed Total Market 
(19XX) Companies Capitalization (HKD Billion) 
93 454 3,089 
92 388 1,332 
91 337 958 
90 289 653 
89 288 608 
88 293 590 
87 265 420 
8 6 2 4 5 4 0 9 
85 240 262 
84 247 185 
83 248 144 
Source : Hong Economic Journal, 3 Jan 94, page 25. 
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APPENDIX III 
Percentages of Shares Owned by Major Influential Families 
(as at 31 Dec 1993) 
Percentage of 
Families Companies Total Shares_ 
Li Shau Kee Henderson 66.82 
Kadoorie HK & Shanghai Hotels 60.96 
China Light 24.81 
Pao Yue Kong Wheelock 49.31 
Kwok Tak Shing Sun Hung Kai 44.46 
Cheng Yu /lung New World 37.43 
Gordon Wu Hopewell 37.43 
Li Ka Shing Cheung Kong 34.96 




PRC Domiciled Companies (H Share) Listed in 1993 
Market Capitalization 
as at 31 Dec 93 Date of 
company mKD million) listing 
Maanshan Steel 3,933 20 Oct 
Shanghai Petrochemical 1,461 6 Jul 
Tsingtao Beer 126 1 Jul 
Guangzhou Shipyard Intl 301 20 Jul 
Beiren Printing Machinery 208 22 Jul 
Kumming Machinery 129 23 Jul 




Statistics on Director's Remuneration for 1993 (All figures in HKD 
… . � Dividend/ million) 
Market N.Profit 
Capitalization Dividend ( % ) 
company … 计 31 Dec 93� (92/93) (92/93) 
Kin son Ele. 251 4.62/4.69 15.7/196 
Chee Shing Hldg 650 3.36/3.56 7.7/288 
universal Appliances 270 3.61/4.67 151/196 
yanion Intl Hldg 144 2.7/4.3 65.9/178 
China investment Hldg 819 3.04/2.69 “/111 
Sincere Co 1,170 19.4/44.4 7.2/95 
Cheung Wah Development 358 4.4/9.9 12.4/71.8 
Morning Star Hldg 440 4.3/5.1 55.8/66.4 
process Automation Hldg 515 3.1/3,9 52.9/58.7 
Seapower Intl Hldg 1,010 9.1/18.3 30.7/51 
VTech Hldg Ltd 1,270 1.64/1.17 7.3/50 
Source : Hong Kong Economic Journal, 3 Jan 94, page 32. 
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Dear Sir/Madam : 
Re : Survey of the Minority Shareholders, Protection 
in the current Hong Kong Stock Market 
工 am writing to respectfully request you to spare some 
minutes of your time to kindly participate in the above 
survey by completing the attached questionnaire. 
工 am student in the MBA part time programme at the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong. The objective of the survey is to 
investigate the current sufficiency of protection to 
minority shareholders in Hong Kong. Please read each 
question carefully and answer it according to how you 
personally feel about it. For the survey to be meaningful, 
we urge you to kindly answer all the questions. 
Kindly return completed questionnaires sealed in the 
stamped envelope provided to the undersigned. Respondents 
are guaranteed compete anonymity and their responses will 
be held in the strictest confidence. 
\ 
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1 -Insider Trading 
(a) Under existing law, a person found to have been involved in insider 
dealing may be required to surrender to government any profit made 
or loss avoided through insider dealing. He was also liable to 
disqualification from holding company directorships. 
Should Insider dealing offence be changed to criminal offence as in 
other major financial centres in the United Kingdom and United States 
of America ？ 
Yes No No Comment 
(b) The Government considers that criminal or civil sanctions would not 
be effective in preventing insider dealing in Hong Kong, since it would 
often be impossible to obtain sufficient evidence for the courts. There 
have been so few successful prosecutions under insider trading 
legislation in the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States of 
America. 
Enforcement is weak and costly. Do you agree? 
Yes No No Comment 
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2.Director's Remuneration 
At the moment the Listing Rules do not prevent a director who is also 
a shareholder from voting at a shareholders meeting on a resolution 
concerning that director's remuneration. Do you agree to the proposal 
that directors and their associates should be prohibited from voting 
on their own remuneration package at a shareholders meeting ？ 
Yes No No Comment 
.^•intfirim Results； Announcement 
Some of the PRC based companies, e.g. Tsingtao Beer has prepared 
not to have interim financial results announcement in future because 
of the difference in accounting procedures and methods across the 
border. The practice does violate the existing regulation providing 
annual financial reports are produced accordingly. However, degree 
of transparency of company will be definitely reduced. Should Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange regularized the interim results announcement 
to every listed companies wherever they are domiciled ？ 
Yes No No Comment 
\ 
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4.ResDQnsibiiitv of Auditors 
Accountants have a contractual obligation to their clients. This 
stipulates they cannot reveal any information to a third party without 
the client's consent. On the other end, they also agreed they have a 
moral obligation to call the Government's attention to any 
irregularities in a company's financial statements.The proposal calls 
on the Government to amend appropriate legislation to require such 
a tripartite meeting to be called to discuss any suspected 
irregularities. In this way, accountants cannot be ruled as having 
breached contractual obligations with their clients. Do you agree to 
the above proposed legislation ？ 
Yes No No Comment 
R Fnrpjqn Domicilfiri Companies 
The Stock Exchange is considering to waive a number of listing 
requirements for some of the bigger companies in a bid to keep their 
primary listings in the territory. The reason behind for the relaxation 
in rules is if such a form of exempt listing was not made available, a 
total delisting in Hong Kong would be the ultimate alternative for 
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foreign companies taking the view that to be regulated in Hong Kong 
after 1997 is an unacceptable risk. 
However, stringent measures against those companies domiciled 
overseas are requested by some people in Hong Kong. Considering 
the overseas section in the existing ordinance insufficient in scope 
and sanction as far as protecting shareholders was concerned. 
The Securities and Futures Commission is also studying extending 
Hong Kong's company law jurisdiction to a far greater extent than 
what is currently in practice. This could involve amending the 
Companies and Securities Ordinance to make offshore companies 
with a primary listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange liable to 
some or all of the provisions which apply to publicly-listed companies 
incorporated here. 
Should Hong Kong Stock Exchange be more relax or stringent 
towards foreign domiciled companies ？ 
Yes No No Comment 
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6.Shares Buv Back 
Hong Kong listed companies are required to obtain prior permission 
not only from the Securities and Futures Commission and the Stock 
Exchange but from its shareholders as well before being allowed to 
buy back their shares. Is the current measures fair to both majority 
and minority shareholders ？ 
Yes No No Comment 
7 RF> FARE OF INFORMATION ON FUTURE PROFITABILITY 
The release of any projected profits by issuers or their directors by 
way of press announcement, press release or any other means 
constitutes the disclosure of price sensitive information and they are 
now under more stringent regulations by Stock Exchange than before. 
Is it reasonable to have such change ？ 




(a) Discretionary Trust 
Section 14 (1)(a) in part two of the Ordinance exempts shareholders 
of 10 percent or more holdings from notifying the authorities if the 
authorities if the interests are held in a trust. This disclosure law 
exempts substantial shareholders of listed companies from notifying 
any discretionary interests. Discretionary trusts are common in 
Hong Kong for tax purposes. Proposal to include ownership in form 
of discretionary trusts when calculating the above 10% is subject to 
discussion. What is your opinion ？ 
Yes No No Comment 
(h) Trigger Level 
The current trigger point for a genera丨 offer of 35% or the annual 
"creeper" provision-the maximum amount of shares a person 
controlling 35-50% can buy in any 12 months of 5%-are arguable in 
the market. • Some regulators argued either in favour of lowering the 
annual restriction from 5% to 2% of outstanding shares or extending 
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the one-year period to two, while maintaining the 5% level. Do you 
think the above is reasonable ？ 
Yes No No Comment 
Q INTRDDUCTION OF I N D E P E N D E N T DIRECTORS IN BOARD 
By 1 Jan 94, every company listed, or desiring to be listed, on the 
stock exchange of Hong Kong will be obliged to appoint at least one 
independent non-executive director to the Board. By the end of 94, 
the Listing Rules will be tightened even further, with the requirement 
that a second, independent non-executive director be appointed. 
(a) What is your optimal no. of independent directors in board ？ _ _ 
(b)Do you think the introduction of above can help to protect the 
outside shareholders ？ 




List of Companies to which Questionnaires were sent 
ABC COMMUNlCATIONS (HOLDINGS) LTD. 
ACME LANOes HOlDiNGS LTD. 
ALCO HOLDINGS LTD. 
. AlLAN-INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. I. AWED GROUP LTD. 
AWED INDUSTRIES INTERNAnONAL LTD. 
. AWED PRO~RnES (HONG KONG) LID. 
AMOY PROPERTIES LTD. 
8::6' AsIA LTO. 
8ALTRANS HOLDINGS LTD. 
SANK OF EAST ASIA , LTD .. 11-lE' 
SEAUFORTE INVESTORS CORPORA nON LTD. 
8EIJING OEVt:LOPMENT (HONG '.<ONG) LTD . 
8EiREN PRINnNG MACHINERY HOLDINGS LTD . 
8ENELUX INTERNAnONAL LID. 
8UlLOMORE INTERNATIONAL LTD. 
aURUNGAME !NTEf<NATlONAL CO. LTD. 
SURWILL HOLDINGS liD: 
C~NTURY CITY INTERNATrONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 
C!-1AMPION TECHNOLOGY HOLDINGS LTD. 
CHEE SHING HOLDINGS LTD. 
CHEN HSONG HOLDINGS LTD. 
CHESTERFIELD LTD. 
CHEUK NANG ;:JROPEJ:(TIES (HOLDINGS) UD. 
Ci-IEUNG '.<ONG (HOLDINGS) LTD. 
C!-1EUNG WAH DEVELOPMENT CO. liD. 
C H EVALIER DEVELOPMENT INTEi"<NATlCN.A.L L7C). 
CHEV AUER INTE f<NA iiONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 
CHEVAllER (OA) INTERNAflONAL liD. 
CHI CHEUNG iNVESTMENT CO. LTD . 
. CHINA AEi<OS?AC~ !NTE:<NATlONAL HOLDINGS LiD . 
C HINA ASSCiS (HOLDINGS) LTD . 
Ci-IINA &. EASTERN INVESlMENT CO. LTD. 
C;..,INA INDUSlRfAL INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION LTD . 
CHINA INVESTMENTS HOLDINGS LiD. 
C:-'1NA UGi-1T &. POWER CO . LTD . 
C:-lINA MorOR sus CO . UD. 
DAH SING I=INANCIAL HOLDINGS LTD . 
DI\IDO CONCRETE (H.'.<.) LTD . 
D/\JI<Y l=i\RM INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD . 
DENWAY INVESHv1[Nf LTD . 
DICKSON CONCEPrs ( INTERNATIONAl) LTD . 
DICKSON CONsmucnON INTERNATIONAL LTD . 
DOUALE KINGDOM HOLDINGS LTD. 
DRANSFIELD HOLDINGS LTD . 
DYNAMIC HOLDINGS LTD. 
EAsr ASIATIC CO (H .K.) LTD . . THE 
EASTeRN CEt'HURY HOLDINGS LTD . 
EGi\NI\ INTERNATIONAL (HOLDINGS) LTD . 
ElEC & EUEK INTERNAflONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 
EMPEROR (CHINA CONCEPD INVESTMENTS LTD. 
EMPEROR INTERNAIIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 
ESSENTIAL ENTERPRISES CO. LTD. 
EU YAN SANG (HONG KONG) LTD. 
EVERGO INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS CO. LTD. 
FAI INSURANCES LTD . 
FAIRWOOD HOLDINGS LTD. 
. . . 
FOUR SEAS MERCANTILE HOLDINGS LTO. 
FOUR SEAS mAvEL INTERNATIONAL LTD. 
FP8 8ANK HOLDING CO. LTD. 
FRANKIE DOMINION INTERNATIONAL LTD. 
FU HUI JEWELLERY CO. (H.X.) LTD. 
I=UNG CHEUNG KEE HOLDINGS LTD. 
FURAMA HorEL ENTERPRISES LTD. 
GENe:RAL ELECTRONICS LTD. 
GIOROANO HOLDINGS LTD. 
GL YNHILL INTERNA f10NAl LTD. 
GOI () PEAK INDUSTRIES (HOLDINGS) LTD. 
HAl HONG HOLDINGS CO. LTD. 
HANG LUNG DEVELOPMENT CO. LTD. 
HANG SENG BANK. LTD. 
HANNY MAGNET1CS (HOLDINGS) LTD . 
HANSOM HOLDINGS LTD. 
HANW~H HOLDINGS LTD. _ 
HARBOUR CENTRE DEVELOPMENT LTD . 
HARBOUR RiNG INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 
HAW PAR BROTHERS INTERNATIONAL LTD. 
HENDERSON INVESTMENT LTD. 
H.ENDERSON'cAND DEVELOPMENT CO. LTD. 
HONG- KONG AIRCRAFT ENGINEERING-CO. LTD. 
HONG KONG & CHINA GAS CO. LTD .• THE 
HONG '.<ONG BUILDING & LOAN AGENCY LTD .. THE 
HONG KONG DAILY NEWS HOLDINGS LTD. 
HONG KONG FERRY (HOLDINGS) CO. LTD. 
HONG KONG FORTUNE LTD. 
HONG KONG LAND HOLDINGS LTD. 
HONG KONG PARKVIEW GROUP LTD .. THE 
HONG KONG REALTY & TRUST CO. LTD. 'A' 
HONG KONG TELECOMMUNICATIONS LTD. 
HONG KONG TOY CENTRE INTERNAflONAL LTD. 
HONG KONG & SHANGHAI HOTELS. LTD .. THE 
HONG'.<EW INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS liD. 
HONGKONG CHINA LTD. 
HONG'.<ONG ELECTRIC HOLDINGS LTD 
HONG'.<ONG MACAU (HOLDINGS) liD 
HOP HING HOLDINGS LTD . 
HOP YING INTERNAflONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 
HOPEWELL HOLDINGS LTD. 
~J' I(\ I OVl\flVE INTERNATIONAL (HOLDINGS) LTD 
't-Jl'lOVISIONSHOLDINGS LTD. 
IN rERNA rtONAL--PIPE·UO. 
I(\JrERNArIONAL TAK CHEUNG HOLDII'~GS LTD. 
ISl/\ND DyEING & PRINTING CO. LTD. 
J}\«DINE INrr::RNI\TlONAL MOTOR HOLDINGS LTD. 
";/\ROINE MA THESON HOLDINGS LTD . 
. JI\RDINr STRArEGIC HOLDINGS liD. 
JCG l-iOLDINGS LTD . 
JINHUI HOLDINGS CO. LTD. 
JOHNSON ELECTRIC HOLDINGS LTD. 
JOYCE BourlQUE LTD. 
K. WI\H INTERNArtONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 
KA WAH SANK UD .. THE 
KA()ER HOLDINGS CO. LTD . 
KAI MING INVESTMENT CO. LTD. 
KECK SENG INVESTMENTS (HONG KONG) LTD. 
KEE SHfNG (HOLDINGS) LTD. 
KENG I=ONG SIN KEE CONST. & INVEST. CO. LTD. 
KIN SON ELECTRONIC (HOLDINGS) CO. LTD. 
KING FOOK HOLDINGS LTD. 
KONG WAH HOLDINGS LTD. 
KOSONIC INrERNATlONAl HOLDINGS LTD. 
KOWLOON MorOR BUS CO. (1933) LTD .. THE 
K.P.f CO. LTD. 
KUMAGAJ GUMI (HONG KONG) LTD. 
KWONG SANG HONG INTERNATIONAL LTD .. THE 
LAI SUN DEVELOPMENT CO. LTD. 
LAI SUN GAJ?MENT (INTERNAnONAl) LTD. 
LAM SOON (HONG KONG) LTD. 
LAM SOON FOOD INDUSTRIES LTD. 
LAMF.X HOLDINGS LTD. 
LANE CRAWFORD INTERNATIONAL LTD. 'A' 
LAP HENG CO. LTD. 
ss 
~~~ ~~~.,~-..  z~Z·-··~~~~ ·~~K~~@._ .. ;~L~t 
I /\WS :NIERNATIONAL HOLDINGS lTD 
I f SAUNDA HOLDINGS LTD. ' . 
I f/\DING SPiRIT (HOLDINGS) CO. LTD. 
II fIliNG DEVELOPMENT LTD. 
It p·UNG-ASCO PRINTERS HOLDINGS LTD. 
tFI StllNG HONG LTD. 
l (UNG KEE HOLDINGS LTD. 
U 5t FUNG UD. 
- l/NKfUL INTERNAIIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 
lIPPO LTD. 
IIU CHONG HING INVESTMENT LTD. 
MIRAMAR HOTEL &INVESTM-ENTCO. LH). 
MORNING STAR HOLDINGS LTD. 
NAM P€I HONG (HOLDINGS) L TD~ . 
NANYANG HOLDINGS LTD. 
NATIONAL ELECTRONICS HOlDINGS LTD~ 
NATIONAL MUTUAL ASIA LTD. 
NEW ISLAND PRINTING HOLDINGS LTD. 
NEW WORLD DEVELOPMENT CO. LTD. 
NEWFOUNDLAND INTERNA TlONAL CO. LTD. 
NGI\IUK INDUSTRIAL HOLDINGS LTD. 
NOmTY INTERNATIONAL GROUP LTD. 
NOVEL ENTERPRISES LTD_ 
OC£:AN INFORMATION HOLDINGS LTD. 
OCFAN-LAND DEVELOPMENT LTD. 
ONFEM HOLDINGS LTD. 
ORIENT OVERSEAS (INTERNATIONAL) LTD. 
ORIENT POWER HOLDINGS LTD. 
ORIENT TELECOM & TECHNOLOGY HOLDINGS LTD. 
ORIENT' AL PRESS GROUP LTD. 
OXFORD PROP£:RflES & FINANCE LTD. 
PACIFIC CONCORD HOLDINGS LTD. 
r'ACPO HOLDINGS LTD. 
I:OAK FAH YEOW INTERNATIONAL LTD. 
PALADIN LTD. 
PAll8URG INTERNA T10.NAL HOLDINGS LTD. 
/JAYMOND INDUSTRIAL LTD. 
I'JEALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP. LTD. 'A' 
REGAL HOTELS INTERNAflONAL HOLDINGS LTD-;-··· __ · · -
RHINE HOLDINGS UD . 
nlGHTEOUS (HOLDINGS) LTD. 
RIVERA (HOLDINGS) LTD. 
I~JP ELECTRONICS LTD . 
RYODEN DEVELOPMENT LTD. 
S. MEGGA INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS-LTD 
SAFETY GODOWN CO. LTD. 
SHUt. liNG CO. LTD. 
SHUN CHEONG HOlDINGS LTD. 
SllUN HO CONSTRUCTION (HOLDINGS) LTD. 
SHUN 110 RESOURCES HOLDINGS LTD. 
SHUN SHING HOLDINGS LTD. 
SHUN TAK HOtOINGS LTD. 
SILVER EAGLE HOLDINGS LTD. 
SILVER GRANT INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIES LTD. 
SIME DAi(SY HONG KONG LTD. 
SINCERE CO. LTD .• THE 
SING T AO HOLDINGS LTO_ 
SINGAMAS CONTAJNER HOLDINGS LTD. 
56 
SINGAPOQE HONG KONG PROPERTIES INVESTMENT LTD. 
SINO LANO-C.O •. LTD; 
SIS INTERNATIONAl HOLDINGS LTD. 
SOUJH CHINA8ROKERAGE CO. LTD. 
SOUTH S;[11NA HOLDINGS LTD. 
SOUfH CHINA INDUSTRIES LTD. 
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HOLDINGS) LTD. 
SOUTH SEA DEVELOPMENT CO. LTD. 
SOUTHEAST ASIA PROPERTIES & FINANCE LTD. 
STAR ENTERTAINMENT (INTERNATiONAL HOLDING) LTD. 
STAR PAGING (INTERNATIONAL HOLDING) LTD. 
STARLIGHT INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 
STARUIE HOLDINGS LTD. 
SlELUX HOLDINGS LTD. 
STONE ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY LTD. 
STYLAND HOLDINGS LTD. 
SUN HUNG KAI & CO. LTD. 
SUN HUNG KAI PROPERTIES LTD. 
SUNG FOO KEE HOLDINGS LTD. 
SUWA INTERNArlONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 
SWANK INfERNAflONAL MANUFACTURING C0. LTD. 
SWll YNN INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 
SWIRE PACIFIC LTD. 'A' 
TACK HSIN HOLDINGS LTD. 
r Al CHEUNG HOLDINGS LTD. 
TAl PING CARPET INTERNATIONAL LTD . 
r AI SANG LAND DEVELOPMENT LTD r 
f AK SING ALLIANCE HOLDINGS LTD. 
T AK WING INVESTMENT (HOLDINGS) LTD. 
TEAM CONCEPTS HOLDINGS LTD. 
fECHTRONIC iNDUSTRIES CO. LTD. 
fELETECH INTERNATIONAL HOLDlNGS LTD, 
fELEVISION BROADCASTS LTD. 
rEM FAT HING FUNG (HOLDINGS) LTD. 
.. _- _.--_ . __ . _- -- .- - ---- .- --- -
TERM8RAY INDUSTRIES INTERNATIONAL (HOLDINGS) LTD. 
fERN PROPERTIES CO. LTD. 
fEXWINCA HOLDINGS LTD. 
flAN AN CHINA INVESTMENTS CO. LTD. 
ilAN TEeK LAND LTD, 
TIPHOOI( PLC 
• :'. ':: " ~~E,",,'-J"": ONAl (HClC!NGS) UD. 
rOMSON PACIFIC LTD. 
TOP FORM INTERNATIONAL LTD. 
TOPSTYlE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 
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